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VOICE FILE NAME:  COHP (Ambassador Abdul Minty) 
 
Key: 
 
SO: Sue Onslow (Interviewer) 
AM: Abdul Minty (Respondent) 
 
SO: Dr Sue Onslow interviewing Ambassador Abdul Minty in Geneva, on 12th 
February 2013. Ambassador Minty, thank you very much for agreeing to 
be interviewed for our oral history project on the Commonwealth. 
Please, if I could begin by asking you about leading Commonwealth 
personalities whom you met and knew? First and foremost, these are 
Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda. President Nyerere was one of the 
patrons of your World Campaign, and possessed a clear vision of  
African solidarity. 
 
AM: When Nyerere came to London for constitutional talks (for the independence 
of Tanganyika), I met him and because we had an office of the Anti-Apartheid 
Movement, we interacted with him regularly. And so we got to know him and 
other Commonwealth leaders who came there for similar talks.  So that 
relationship continued subsequently.  Then, since I went to virtually every 
Commonwealth summit save two until 1994.  What I had to do - was to 
provide information to the developing countries, as to what was happening in 
South Africa.  None of them had embassies, or missions, or interest sections 
there, so they would work in a relatively isolated position.  So Nyerere always 
asked (for information) and we planned in advance and I discussed regularly 
at the United Nations, Dar-es-Salaam, and elsewhere; so we worked together 
very, very well.  Then later they invited me to also go and see the Front Line 
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States. I went to their meetings; and always worked with the OAU and also 
the OAU Liberation Committee. 
 
SO: So, Sir, when did your collaboration - if I may call it that without 
suggesting any pejorative sense - begin with Nyerere? 
 
AM: In 1961… 
 
SO: In 1961? So this was after the Anti-Apartheid Movement was established 
and you had become the movement’s Honorary Secretary? 
 
AM: No, no, even before I was Honorary Secretary. He was one of the main 
speakers when we launched the Boycott Movement in 1959, and because, as 
I say, (the African leaders) were then coming regularly for constitutional talks 
in London, so we met them then. When we had our campaigns: they would 
support us, Kenneth Kaunda too; and of course all the Commonwealth 
conferences then were in London, so we went to brief them before each 
conference. So, we had to go to the fancy Grosvenor Hotel and some others - 
I had never been in those places - to brief them, to tell them what we were 
doing.  Then we had this great campaign with Barbara Castle, working day 
and night. We had a vigil outside the Commonwealth Prime Ministers summit 
(in March 1961) to exclude South Africa from the Commonwealth.  That was 
our first major campaign and we succeeded. It was Macmillan who was the 
Chairman of the conference because the British government were hosts, and 
they were always the Chairman of the conference. Nobody thought we would 
succeed, but Barbara Castle was tireless. I was working with her at the 
Labour Party Conference and as she sat on the platform, she wrote hundreds 
of letters and signed them, and I sat there passing her letter after letter.  So 
we got playwrights, actors of various kinds, artists, we had a 72-hour vigil 
outside the Commonwealth conference where all personally stood for one 
hour each day and night, and then Mr Macmillan was told by African leaders 
and others that, “You say you don’t support…, but outside are these people 
who are very prominent and are all asking for it.”  So, of course South Africa 
then withdrew its application.  We followed the South African Prime Minister: 
South African Prime Ministers hadn’t attended previous meetings, only 
Foreign Ministers would attend but Verwoerd came, so we followed him; and 
his supporters burnt our office.  So a couple of persons were convicted of 
3 
 
setting fire to it and we lost some money and documents. But anyway that 
was a price we had to pay. 
 
SO: Sir, going through the Anti-Apartheid Movement papers in the Bodleian 
Library in Oxford, I was particularly struck by your preparation of 
briefing material before each Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
Conference. In particular, I am aware you went to the Singapore CHOGM 
meeting in 1971, flying via India, and requested to meet the - 
 
AM: 1971 was critical for us because the British government wanted to supply 
arms to South Africa and we got thousands of petitions signed against it.  We 
got every bishop in Britain to sign as well. 
 
SO: I have a note here that you got 18 million signatures.  
 
AM: Yes, it could be, in terms of the representation then; for example, all the trade 
unionists signed it, so in terms of their membership, this ran to millions. I took 
two big suitcases full with me to Singapore, and when I went to the airport we 
had to get a taxi. We didn’t have much money in those days, and two big 
suitcases just with the petitions.  So, we stuck the petitions on the suitcase 
cover, so everybody could see the text! Then I had a smaller bag with my 
clothes and I went in this taxi.  Now, I can’t remember how much money I 
had, or if it was going to be just enough. But when I got to the airport, the taxi 
driver said, “No, you don’t have to pay me”.  Then I went to the Pan Am airline 
desk as clearly I had excess luggage. The check in person looked, and she 
said, “There’s nothing to pay”. So they were human beings acting way outside 
(the formal rules)! 
 
SO: Yes. 
 
AM: But the Singapore authorities apparently wanted to arrest me. 
 
SO: Did they? 
 
AM: Yes, just before I arrived, there were such reports. - 
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SO: Even though you had an appointment with the Singapore Foreign 
Minister? 
 
AM: No, that was granted afterwards. They wouldn’t give me an appointment 
initially. No, they refused; they didn’t want to have anything to do with me. 
 
SO: So, you arrived at the airport in Singapore and they didn’t want to admit 
you? 
 
AM: No. There were reports in the Singapore press and elsewhere that if I come 
and do something like engage in protest they will lock me up. So actually 
Nigerians officials apparently said, “If you detain him, we won’t be here for the 
conference”. I don’t know what effect they had.  I found this out later.  When I 
got to the airport, their security followed me closely as well. And after my 
arrival I kept asking for an appointment, and later I asked the Secretary 
General of the Commonwealth if I could give him the petitions instead.  In the 
end, he said, “Yes, Abdul, we’ll try. If not, I will receive them from you”.  Then 
inside the Commonwealth meeting, what happened was that Premier Lee 
Kuan Yew was emphasising, in harmony with the British, that there was a 
major Russian communist threat in the southern oceans.  So, the question of 
selling helicopters to South Africa turned on the Simonstown Agreement. So 
Prime Minister Heath said, “These Africans don’t understand”.  Before that 
meeting, we had African leaders going to London to lobby Downing Street 
and to see the Prime Minister. When we got to Singapore, the issue arose 
and Ted Heath said, “Look, you cannot use helicopters against the liberation 
movements. It’s only for (use against) the Russian vessels, and (for the) 
patrolling South African ships.  So these helicopters are for use on the South 
African naval ships”.  Well, I knew that they would argue like that, so I 
collected some clippings from the South African newspapers in advance 
which showed the regime’s anti-guerrilla exercises using ships.  I didn’t use 
them earlier. I just kept them.  When this argument came up in Singapore, I 
went to Nyerere. I told him this, so he got together Obote and Kaunda, and 
the four of us discussed what to do. Nyerere was always leading initiatives so 
he suggested that the Foreign Minister of Uganda should actually have a 
press conference and expose this.  I gave him all of my material and Uganda 
then said, “Here are pictures that show South Africans using ships for anti-
guerrilla warfare” - so this threw a spanner in the works completely.  Then one 
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night the Singapore authorities arranged that in all of our pigeonholes, we got 
pictures of Russian ships going past Singapore. This was to show now the 
communist threat. “You see this?” I think Singapore papers also talked about 
the fact that their region had to give their lives in the last war. Then President 
Kaunda said, “Yes, there are people even buried here in this region who are 
our nationals.  We also gave our lives.  We lost Zambian citizens, so don’t 
come with that argument”. So African leaders got annoyed that this campaign 
was being used also to defend the South African military. 
 
It was only six helicopters that Britain wanted to provide Pretoria with, for 
which they were prepared to break up the Commonwealth. Then President 
Obote wanted to go home because he had a warning about a possible coup. 
He tried to get East African Airways, which the three countries Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda owned, to send a plane but no plane came to pick him 
up. He was wondering why and then there was a coup.  And then some 
journalists in Singapore informed that the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec 
Home, reportedly even said, “That loud mouth Kaunda might find himself in 
the same situation.”  So then many wondered; “Good God, is a coup being 
promoted?” Later the British TV programme World in Action, did a one-hour 
programme.  The heading was, How a General Stole a Nation.  They 
interviewed Israeli security officials who had been in Uganda, and invited by 
Obote to help to train their military. They asked one of these guys, “Did you 
help with the coup?”  “Yes, we were in the country to help the military”.  Then 
Amin was very clever.  He turned the whole situation against the British by 
using the Indians and the issue of British passports. He threw the British 
Ugandan Asians out and then the Israelis out, so anyone who touched Amin 
would then be accused of being an agent of the British, or of Israel.  So that’s 
how Amin survived for such a long time in that period.  
 
Irrespective of who was responsible for the coup, for six helicopters these 
countries took a stand. They had a President removed, and many of our 
friends were killed in Makerere University and elsewhere. So, it was a very 
heavy price that African leaders and others have paid over the whole period 
of fighting apartheid.  Anyway, at the 1971 conference when it became 
evident that the Commonwealth was concerned about the role of Singapore, 
then the Foreign Minister asked to see me. He said, “I believe you are here 
with petitions. You can bring your petitions and we will have a press 
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conference, and we will get all the newspapers” so he conducted the whole 
event in his office. The tables were put out, I had to go early, their officials 
took all our petitions and displayed them on the tables. 
 
SO: So, suddenly this was the theatre of the presentation? 
 
AM: It became a complete conversion because I think they needed legitimacy from 
the Africans and others. 
 
 
SO: So what of India? I know that you stopped off in India on your way to 
Singapore. 
 
AM: The exciting thing about India is that I stopped because Mrs Gandhi wanted 
to see me.  You see, what we used to do in London was to visit all the 
Commonwealth nations: we prepared with them months before, we gave 
them documents, we took up specific issues with them, they sent these to 
their capitals, they gave questions back; so we interacted in that way.  India 
was very strong in supporting the Anti-Apartheid Movement, but at that time 
Mrs Gandhi was not coming to Singapore for some reason. So I went to India.  
Just before I left India I think the British Foreign Secretary arrived, and there 
were big demonstrations against Britain, in the streets. I saw people with real 
anger.  Then comes Trudeau from Canada and huge crowds were celebrating 
him; so what we were rejoicing at, at that time, is that the public were not 
reacting in any racial way. They could identify this, and the very important 
thing for us at that time was that Canada was against apartheid and a bridge 
builder; as were Australia and New Zealand later on, so Canada’s role was 
really quite critical in the Commonwealth. 
 
SO: Do you think it had anything to do with the fact that the Secretary 
General of the Commonwealth was a Canadian? 
 
AM: It may have had something to do with it, but if you look back at Canada’s role 
it had a Nordic type of policy in relation to Africa. 
 
SO: A moral agenda towards Africa? 
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AM: Yes, The Secretary General was the first Secretary General who was also 
well-disposed and, as I say, he told me that, “If they [the Singaporeans] don’t 
meet you, I will meet you and receive the petitions”.  So, we knew that 
someone would receive our petitions but we had to try first with the Chair of 
the Commonwealth. We didn’t expect it and they didn’t behave towards us as 
if we could expect it; but later they did receive us. Then of course I used to 
attend the meetings of the British journalists because we published Anti-
Apartheid News so they couldn’t keep me out! [Laughs] In some of those 
meetings in later Commonwealth Summits I would hear all they said in the 
briefings and then we would know what their line was on many issues.  But, 
Singapore became a turning point in that the position taken on the arms issue 
remained one that the Commonwealth was united on later. The media played 
a big role.   
 
 
SO: Excuse me sir, when you say ‘we’, whom do you mean beside yourself? 
Was this the Anti-Apartheid Movement representatives? 
 
AM: Well, there weren’t many at the Summits where   I was usually the only one! 
[Laughter] But for the organisation we had to meet the High Commissioners in 
London. We knew them, we planned before each Summit. Some of them, 
depending on if they trusted us, would say, “Look, this is what’s happening”.  I 
have to prepare the text.  When we saw them at the Commonwealth heads 
meeting, the High Commissioners would be there.  Some of them were asked 
to write the speeches for their Heads so in that process we assisted. We 
worked with all countries but did not become members of particular 
delegations. At the Summits I registered for Anti-Apartheid News, which was 
a monthly newspaper, and then I worked with all Commonwealth countries.  
So, at that time if I had been linked with, let’s say, just one Commonwealth 
country, I would not have been able to work well with some others.  So, we 
worked with everybody but it was the wisdom of our structure early on about 
being impartial with everything and working independently though that did 
mean we had some disadvantages. 
 
SO: Sir, were most of your energies then at Singapore, at Ottawa in 1973 and 
then in ’75 at Kingston, devoted towards South Africa? 
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AM: No, Southern Africa. 
 
SO: So Rhodesia was also very much part of your agenda? 
 
AM: And Angola and Mozambique.  We used to take up all the issues and in fact I 
used to meet representatives from the former Portuguese colonies regularly. 
For different reasons, they asked me to help them in Europe as well. They 
had no representatives in Europe, the ANC and SWAPO had.  When they 
came to Europe they would often ask me to join them and then after they left, 
I would follow up whatever had to be done in different European countries: 
We were a genuine solidarity movement.   
 
You see, I was initially the Membership Secretary and our Honorary Secretary 
also a South African, Rosalyn Ainslie was expecting a baby so she couldn’t 
continue in that role. We had just managed to get Barbara Castle to be highly 
active in AAM.  She came to speak at our main rally after Sharpeville in 1960 
where we changed our name to the Anti-Apartheid Movement from the 
Boycott Movement and thereafter there was a strong demand for her to serve 
as the President of the Anti-Apartheid Movement. She apparently said she 
would serve but that I should be the Secretary [laughs]. We knew each other 
very well and I had worked closely with her over several campaigns.   
 
So, one day when Oliver Tambo was in London he told me, “No, you must do 
this and you must not make the Anti-Apartheid Movement an extension of the 
ANC.  You must win your support from the British people and you must 
respond to them”.  I was young and quite upset at apparently being 
disengaged from the Liberation struggle. So it had to be and we all learnt 
much from the leadership provided by Oliver Tambo. Later more and more we 
saw his great wisdom.   The Anti-Apartheid Movement had on its national 
committee the ANC, PAC, ZANU and ZAPU; we worked with all.  Throughout 
the Lancaster House negotiations we organised meetings in the House of 
Commons for briefings by ZANU leadership and ZAPU leadership and so on, 
so we worked with all of them.  And this was quite wise when you look at it 
since Britain was the centre of the anti-apartheid global movement. There 
weren’t many strong anti-apartheid movements in many countries. We were 
the strongest at the time. 
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 It meant that what we did also caught the news, so we became quite central. 
Once I went to the UN to give evidence and later I wrote a letter to the UN to 
suggest that a special committee against apartheid be set up. Some thought it 
was impertinent to suggest to the UN what it should do.   So now when we 
are marking 50 years of the OAU, it’s also 50 years of the anti-apartheid 
committee. It was not called ‘anti-apartheid’ because the rest of the countries 
wouldn’t allow it.  It’s the only committee in the UN that was boycotted by the 
West.  So, it had mainly Communist countries and African/Asian countries so 
we worked very closely with them in the UN Special Committee on the 
Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (later 
called the Special Committee on Apartheid); and of course after that, the 
Rivonia Trial started in 1963 with Mandela among the accused.  There was a 
Treason Trial in 1956 which some of us campaigned against since 1958 and I 
worked with Canon Collins who had raised the money to defend those 
Treason Trial accused who were eventually freed. He actually helped to save 
their lives, so we also worked with the OAU.  I was invited to the meetings as 
a guest of the OAU and the first Chairman of the Special Committee on 
Apartheid was then made Secretary General of the OAU.  So there’s a whole 
link, you see, in the global movement. We were also in touch with the Afro-
Americans in the US to try and get support.  We were sitting in London writing 
letters to anyone and everyone.  Then I went to Leeds University for a year to 
do law.  I went to see the Vice Chancellor, and Professor Ayer, and asked if 
they would nominate Chief Luthuli for the Nobel Peace Prize - and then when 
Jim Callaghan invited me to a meeting in Coventry I asked for his support. 
And so it went on with letters we wrote across the world and finally we got the 
Nobel Prize for Luthuli, But we were just hitting everywhere with such 
appeals.  
 
SO: I’m very struck, Sir, by the extent to which international solidarity 
against apartheid was founded on networks of well educated, well 
placed people, using London as a hub. 
 
AM: No, it is simply the opportunity we had, and the fact that London was the 
centre of world news. It wasn’t like now, with CNN and others. It was the 
BBC, and much of what we did got reported.  Then we started with the sports 
boycotts, we started with cultural boycotts etc.  We started with small little 
initiatives that nobody knew about, but then one day Peter O’Toole would call 
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and say, “I’m supporting you”.  I would say, “Please get the following 
playwrights together” and he’d get all of them together in his house and we’d 
go and talk to them. When Yehudi Menuhin initially went to South Africa and 
Father Huddleston said he mustn’t perform to segregated audiences. “So I 
tried to perform to a mixed audience and that did not work.” He asked: what 
should I do? I said, “You must boycott” so he did. And Marlon Brando would 
visit London and Ken Tynan, the Cultural Editor of the Observer called me 
and he said, “Abdul, you must see Marlon Brando”.  I said, “Okay”.  So I see 
him and he says, “Now, he doesn’t think we’re doing enough on sanctions.  
He wants to stop all films in South Africa”.  I had to spend a day and a half 
talking to him about these matters! [Laughs] 
 
SO: Sir, you’re mapping out here the network of prominent playwrights, 
writers, politicians, particularly on the left. Within the Liberal Party, I 
know David Steel was a very - 
 
AM: David Steel was a student when he was active as were the Kinnocks. 
 
SO: Student and trade union networks. 
 
AM: It was all voluntary back then. 
 
SO: - and you emphasise very much key Commonwealth leaders.  What of 
the Commonwealth Secretariat after 1965? Was it providing particular 
support? 
 
AM: The Secretariat was not sympathetic on all issues at first. 
 
SO: Really? 
 
AM: Because by raising issues we caused problems but in reality, later it became 
more sympathetic but it always was also watching itself.  The Secretary 
General who had a really imaginative, outstanding, and innovative stance, 
and stands out, is Sonny Ramphal.  He stood out on sheer principle and 
when we were in the Caribbean and elsewhere when we had this problem 
with Thatcher, he developed the EPG, because the Commonwealth works by 
consensus. But Britain was opposed to many anti-apartheid positions and 
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then we saw the communiques stating ‘the Commonwealth, with the 
exception of Britain, decided… 
 
SO: Yes. 
 
AM: And Prime Minister Thatcher was happily thinking Britain was undermining 
the Commonwealth but it in fact rebounded on her. 
 
SO: Just to go back to the beginning of Sonny Ramphal’s time in office: did 
you meet him at the Kingston CHOGM? 
 
AM: Yes and in London before the Summit.  We never went to CHOGM without 
seeing the Secretary General beforehand. And I knew Sonny when he was 
Foreign Minister and UN Ambassador, so I knew some of them before 
because they were in different roles in the UN.  I used to go to the UN almost 
every year because of the apartheid issues and the UN used to invite us to 
meetings of the Anti-Apartheid Committee where we met them. 
 
SO: So, would you have official as well as private discussions with Sonny 
Ramphal as part of his activism?  
 
AM: Well no. He would know I was anti-apartheid and there would be no 
separation between official or private because we always discussed solidarity 
work on Southern Africa.  
 
SO: When did you alert him to the South African government’s 
determination to develop an atomic bomb? 
 
AM: Well, that is another story because I was following this subject in detail.  I was 
also at University College doing a Master’s programme and when it finished, 
the Richardson Institute offered me a fellowship and as I did research, I found 
that  “No, I don’t want to publish this. I want to stop it”.  So, they were upset 
with me and they’d never had a student who doesn’t do his thesis. 
 
SO: [Laughs] I have to say, I don’t think I’ve ever had a PhD student who 
said, “I want to stop”! 
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AM: [Laughs] So I didn’t do it but then I read the small print in every report and 
there I found that South Africa was preparing for a nuclear weapon. There 
was one statement by a minister who said, “We must not look at only the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy”. Then I wrote a booklet in 1969 that 
highlighted this threat, it was translated in a few languages, entitled South 
Africa’s Defence Strategy. 
 
SO: There’s a copy of that booklet in the Anti-Apartheid Movement papers at 
the Bodleian. I saw it on Tuesday. 
 
AM: Yes. I have to consult the full text because it provided the full context and   
there were footnotes and it showed that they wanted to develop a nuclear 
device so it was the first to spell this out - and then it was mentioned when I 
went to address the UN from time to time.  There is a book published by Mr 
ES Reddy of all my speeches in the UN so that provides some further insight. 
 
 So, we promoted this concern and Ruth First who was also in exile and others 
also worked with me on it, but eventually it was all left to me.  So, because I 
did all the research on it, when we went to the World Conference for Action 
against Apartheid in Lagos in 1977, and the second UN/OAU conference - the 
first one was in Oslo in 1973.  I was on the Steering Committee of both, so in 
Lagos we heard that the satellites of the West had detected a South African 
possible nuclear test site.  There was an international outcry and the French 
President said to South Africa “Don’t explode”.  So, I made a statement, “How 
can they explode what they don’t have?” because I had been to every 
Western country regarding their nuclear collaboration and they had all told 
me, “South Africa doesn’t have nuclear weapon capability and our 
cooperation is only for peaceful purposes”.  Now, all of a sudden they were 
saying, “Don’t explode”.  So, I said, “But they can’t explode if they don’t have 
this weapon according to you. Why are you appealing to them?”  So it blew 
up and at Lagos where we were meeting on 5th August this news exploded.  
The Chairman of the UN Committee, Olaf Palme of Sweden, David Steel from 
Britain and many other personalities and leaders of the liberation movements 
were there as was the Norwegian Prime Minister - an old friend since I used 
to visit Norway annually from the early1960’s.  I also went to Norway prior to 
the Lagos conference to persuade the Prime Minister to come to that 
conference because no Heads of Western countries were coming.  When he 
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agreed to come, the Labour Party took a risk because it was ten days or so 
before their general election. Anyway, the Prime Minister came and made a 
very good speech. Norway had just become a member of the Security 
Council so what the Norwegians said is that ‘”if Abdul Minty can come to 
Norway and since we are on the Security Council, we can take up the issue of 
the arms embargo”. They were prepared to fund the office.  So, the UN 
Special Committee made an appeal to the British Anti-Apartheid Movement in 
a formal way to say they would like me to head the new World Campaign 
against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa. We had some 
talks with the Norwegians and it took a little while.  By 1978/9 we opened this 
office and I expected to resign from AAM but they said, “No you cant, you 
have to do both.” 
 
SO: Joan Lester wouldn’t let you! [Laughs] 
 
AM: Yeah, none of them would, so I had to go backwards and forwards between 
London and other countries. So I did both and I remained the Honorary 
Secretary of the AAM. 
 
SO: Thank you, Sir. Now I understand. 
 
AM: We thought the World Campaign would be a temporary arrangement.  Now, 
on Rhodesian sanctions, they had machinery in the Security Council. So we 
had expected that, when the arms embargo against South Africa was finally 
adopted by the Security Council it would also be implemented like that.  On 
the morning when the Council was to discuss the first proposal for an arms 
embargo in September 1977 we went to see Foreign Secretary David Owen 
with a delegation and he said, “We will never support mandatory sanctions 
against South Africa”. Thar Resolution was blocked by the Triple Western 
Veto.  Immediately we worked very hard with the US and Andy Young and 
other delegations. The US reversed the position and we got the positive vote 
of all for these sanctions in November 1977. The international community was 
also preoccupied with the terrible brutality of the apartheid regime which had 
killed Steve Biko in detention and banned the Black Consciousness 
organisations.  These developments also influenced matters at the time.  So 
when we got that decision, we thought now the UN will set up machinery for 
the implementation because they did have some machinery for Rhodesian 
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sanctions but for South African sanctions they didn’t set up any effective 
mechanism. They had a sub-committee of the Security Council that could 
meet regularly.  But as I said in 1977 at the Lagos meeting it was decided by 
the UN that we needed a special office, that was in addition to stop the 
nuclear threat as well.  Remember, ‘nuclear’ is not in the UN resolution. 
 
SO: No. 
 
AM: So, now there was also a real nuclear threat. Then they said “If Abdul Minty 
does it, we will support him” and Norway added, “We will act in the Security 
Council so whatever research he gets done and gives it to us, we will discuss 
it”, so that was a kind of link as well. In reality, it didn’t happen that easily 
because they are also members of NATO.  But anyway, I went to Norway, did 
that work and then when the committee on the arms embargo met, I often 
went to New York to give evidence.  They never refused me a meeting. The 
Chair in the first period was Ambassador Bishara, the Kuwaiti Ambassador; 
he did the best report of all and used some of the evidence I had given. In 
effect I was the only one giving evidence about violations, because no country 
wanted to give evidence about another country that sold arms to South Africa, 
a horrendous experience where no country would report about arms embargo 
violations by South Africa. 
 
SO: Sir, did you liaise in any way with the Commonwealth Secretariat, 
because I know that you were - 
 
AM: Yes. 
 
SO: - conducting a campaign against British export licences and possible 
imports of uranium from South Africa. 
 
AM: Yes.  We used to go to the Commonwealth Secretariat every two or three 
weeks from time to time to see their officials, to see the head of the 
international department and give them material and information.  It would 
depend on how receptive they were.  Informally they helped us.  Formally it 
was a little difficult because some important countries, like Britain, were not in 
favour, so they couldn’t go too far at times unless they had the authority from 
CHOGM. And this is why I went to every conference because we took up 
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issues there; we wrote letters to the Heads of State in advance and made 
suggestions about what decisions to take, things like that. 
 
SO: So this explains why in the Commonwealth Secretariat files there is the 
detailed report on a seminar from the UN Committee against Apartheid. 
It refers specifically to military and nuclear collaboration with South 
Africa. 
 
AM: Yes. The historic thing is that in 1964 we were the first people to hold a World 
Conference on Sanctions in Friends House in London. The UN Committee 
came and the conference legitimised sanctions because we produced all the 
intellectual arguments. It was not just a political campaign.  You see, this is 
also what the whole Anti-Apartheid Movement was quite good at.  We gave 
intellectual content to many of the political demands.  We didn’t just accuse. 
But we also got a lot of false and forged letters both when I was in Oslo and in 
London - we’d get a forged letter which would appear to be on an American or 
British company letterhead, and it would purport to be writing to South Africa 
about arms deals. They wanted us to act on it, and it would not be true.  So, 
there were many attempts to sabotage us. If we had one fact wrong we would 
have been finished. 
 
SO: Well, your credibility would have been seriously damaged, if not 
destroyed. 
 
AM: Because they just did not want to believe us but the fact was that we were 
right every time, they had to respect us. So I had to look at every case very 
carefully: is this what the military needs? Why would they want it? What is it 
that they would need it for? They don’t have that much money so does this 
purchase make sense? We had to do - I can’t say ‘research’ because we 
didn’t have all the tools -but intuitive thinking of putting ourselves in the 
apartheid government’s position; is this a priority?  The same thing with the 
bomb: why would they want it?  To intimidate Africa? Not to use it against 
them, but to frighten them and frighten the world.  So, the West would also at 
times say, “Look, those people are mad.  They even have a nuclear weapon. 
Don’t touch them” and indeed they did do that later, but we were ten years or 
more ahead and anticipated it. 
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SO: So, you believed that it was constructed to be a deterrent? 
 
AM: Well, not deterrent in the normal sense because other deterrents are 
deterrents against another nuclear weapon, and they were not deterring 
anybody with a nuclear weapon.  It was to show their destructive capacity, so 
it was more to frighten and intimidate. So, they just wanted to show that “if 
you mess around with us, we can knock you out and have a small holocaust 
or several small ones.” They had a mentality that worked that way. 
 
SO: Hmm.  Sir, I know that you were one of the prime movers behind the 
campaign, ‘Stop the Apartheid Bomb’ in the beginning of 1980, and it 
had moved by 1983 to ‘Stop the Apartheid War’. Was that problematic 
for you, because I know you were emphasising very much the whole 
question of the nuclear capacity of the South African apartheid regime? 
 
AM: No, we were always thinking of war in the region. Before that, in 1967, South 
Africa had moved into Rhodesia when the armed struggle developed, so they 
already brought that.  Then came the Cuban intervention in Angola; and then 
I also went to the Security Council in 1975, and I disclosed to it internal NATO 
secret forms.  I distributed them and I said, “Here is evidence NATO is 
providing the NATO Codification System for Spares and Equipment to South 
Africa.  It’s not even a member of NATO, so what is going on?” Some western 
members were furious, but they didn’t know at first that I had authentic 
documents. It caused a major crisis. 
 
SO: Because you were arguing that the South Africans needed this 
codification system to construct their Advokaat naval communications 
system? 
 
AM: Yes, and other things. This was used for the spares for the Advokaat. 
 
SO: Yes. And the NATO Secretary General denied any links between NATO 
and South Africa. 
 
AM: That’s a separate matter as to whether he met the South Africans or not. So 
we exposed it and said he shouldn’t meet them in future; and so he said, he 
had met them, but in future he would not.  Now, the Norwegian Foreign 
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Minister was our friend. Before the World Campaign was established, in 1976, 
the NATO meeting took place in Norway.  I went there to lobby the Labour 
Party and others who helped me a lot.  Then we were saying, “You must have 
no links with South Africa.”  So the NATO President as the Norwegian 
Foreign Minister, Knut Frydenlund was - told the NATO Secretary General 
that physically, “You must not meet the South Africans”. I didn’t see the letter 
– but that assurance was given. In response to my letter however - the way 
Secretary General Luns gave the assurance was that the international staff of 
NATO will not meet them.  So I wrote back, “No, not the international staff 
only. NO staff”. Because they do have national staff. 
 
  So, later we found that Luns had a meeting in his house with Pik Botha. So I 
went to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and I said, “This has happened”.  One 
of their senior diplomats said, “No, Abdul. You’ve not been wrong before, but 
now you’re wrong.  I don’t think Luns can mislead my Minister.  I said, “No, 
I’m right.  You check.  He has entertained Pik Botha.”  So then he finally 
admitted that he did meet him but “we only spoke in Afrikaans”. He stated that 
Botha “wanted my advice about reforming apartheid and I told him to get rid 
of petty apartheid”.  So that was the outcome of that.  But after that was the 
decision they cannot meet even for this type of informal meeting.  So, all of 
this just showed the depth of Western commitment to South Africa - that even 
though South Africa was not a member of NATO, they broke the rules to go 
beyond, with full confidence, to assist South Africa. 
 
SO: Sir, was it at all contentious within the ANC that you were Honorary 
Secretary of the Anti-Apartheid Movement and you were also a leading 
figure in the World Campaign? Did you retain your affiliation in any way 
with the ANC? 
 
AM: I didn’t have any direct formal affiliation. I mean, I met them, I discussed 
issues with them, I accepted Oliver Tambo as my leader, if you wish, in South 
Africa but I didn’t publicly espouse ANC policy only.. 
 
SO: I just wondered if there had been any ANC internal debate about 
whether emphasis should be put on South Africa’s acquisition of atomic 
capability, or whether it was felt this would not resonate within broader 
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South African society and generate domestic opposition towards the 
apartheid government? 
 
AM: No, no, this policy that we detailed was usefully behind it.  I continued to do 
some research and what I found I then said, “Listen, these are the facts” and 
they supported it, so there was no disagreement. 
 
SO: The reason I ask that is Jean du Preez reflected [at an academic 
conference at Intundla in December 2012) that there had been some 
dissent within the ANC about whether this was an appropriate policy to 
generate internal opposition to the apartheid government. 
 
AM: I’m sorry to say, but it’s rubbish! 
 
SO: Thank you for clarifying that. 
 
AM: No, because Jean knows nothing about internal ANC discussions. He was 
nowhere near those situations.  What was happening at that time is that Jean 
and a whole lot of people who are still in our Foreign Service were … well, I 
can’t say it was Jean, but the others were all preparing to counteract me and 
the World Campaign.  They distributed all kinds of stuff.  So, they were 
worried: how was I getting this information?   
 
SO: Sir, I did wonder when I saw the amount of detail in the AAM archives. 
 
AM: When Samora Machel got killed, I wrote the first article that said how South 
Africa would have done it. I wrote it in a Mozambique national news agency 
AIM report which was then published in South Africa. 
 
SO: That was in 1986. 
 
AM: I said the device could be kept in a backpack and it would misroute the plane.  
So, the South African Air Force General said, “Oh, this Abdul Minty! He thinks 
he knows a lot about aviation!” So then I wrote another piece to say how bad 
the South Africans were, they didn’t even know where the plane took off, 
basic things you would see through radar. It was like, “They’re stupid.”  Then 
they wrote a piece that said, “No, no, no! We monitored this plane from when 
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it left Malawi”.  So, then I said, “Of course you monitored it because you used 
the Plessey AR3D radar system. It has 16 consuls, you could watch the plane 
every minute but why did you only have the search and rescue operation the 
next morning when they crashed at night?” So they were put in a real spot 
because they were having a duel with me.  Now what happened is they had 
agreed the Nkomati peace deal with Mozambique; and one of the deals was 
that they would publish the AIM articles in South Africa. So I wrote articles for 
AIM and it got published in South Africa, and they started a dialogue with me.  
So now I see the South African government has reopened the investigation of 
that crash and I don’t know whether they have more information or not, but on 
a lot of these matters we were almost the first with information.  I also went to 
the Security Council at that time and I said, “South African troops are in 
Angola”.  They denied it and then later it was found it was true. South African 
troops were in Angola. 
 
SO: How had you picked that up, sir? 
 
AM: Oh that, you don’t worry! [Laughs]  We had to calculate at every moment, 
every minute of our being, day or night, what was happening, and what their 
moves would be. We were very weak relatively and they had so many 
resources so we just had to outdo them.  We had to. We had to work hard. 
 
SO: So information really was power? 
 
AM: Not only information. 
 
SO: Communication? 
 
AM: It was intuition. Because information is massive and you don’t always know 
when it is coming. 
 
SO: So it was analysis, as well? 
 
AM: It is keeping focus of your priorities and what you think is going to happen 
and, if you wish, like a dog with a bone, you don’t let go. You bite onto that 
piece, no matter how much everybody says “No”, and then you surprise 
yourself with your findings.  So it was that kind of thing too.  What gave it to 
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us I don’t know but I think we had the single-minded perspective.  For me, it 
was to try and make sure that we had the least amount of violence:  we used 
to say and Nyerere then coined it very well. “It is the degree of unarmed 
pressure we can put on South Africa that will determine the amount of armed 
pressure we have to use.” 
 
SO: Sir, if I could ask you, please, to comment on other African leaders 
within the Commonwealth such as President Seretse Khama, and 
General Olusegun Obasanjo, both of whom were patrons of the World 
Campaign. Did they provide simply affirmation of what you were already 
doing, or were they active? 
 
AM: No, they were active. They were all active. In Canada in 1973 I had a long 
talk with Seretse about various matters.  It’s just that they were all 
sympathetic.  Also remember Seretse also had a very unpleasant experience 
with the British about his wife. 
 
SO: Yes. 
 
AM: I think that they all respected us because of what we did in Britain. We were 
not coming with any agenda or any favours, or saying how good or bad we 
are.  We had a record and we were working in very difficult conditions in 
Britain with the rise of racism and Powellism.   I remember that at times I used 
to get onto TV and now and then I’d be on the tube in Holborn or somewhere, 
and a strange  Pakistani, or West Indian, would come up to me and say, “Oh 
thank you. I saw you on television.  It’s so good to know that there are people 
against racism.”  So, our campaigns also gave security to immigrants in 
Britain as the Anti-Apartheid Movement strengthened. Then some people 
wanted us to go into the field of race relations. I opposed it, because if we did 
we would not have a single subject Movement.  We would divide our forces.  
But we would support others, so we would make statements of support but 
we did not have the expertise to work on it. But as far as a lot of our branches 
were concerned they were involved in different ways:  For example, when I 
went to Birmingham in 1960, I found in the West Indian community there was 
great fear and we discussed issues with them.  So although we were anti-
apartheid and worked on Southern Africa, we talked to them about other 
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issues and the wisdom of certain issues. These were just additional things 
that happened that we didn’t plan for at that time. 
 
SO: You’re pointing to a dynamic of a moral agenda of racial justice in 
seeking the downfall of the apartheid regime, which went with working 
to combat racism within the UK? 
 
AM: Because the most remarkable experiences were the rugby demonstrations 
and the ones on cricket, because we worked on it. I remember I had a big 
fight once at one of our meetings when I said, “Apartheid sport, was totally 
wrong. Others said: We mustn’t work on sport and focus on our political 
campaigns.  This was settled early. I was representing the South African Non-
Racial Olympic Committee from London after I left South Africa so I also went 
to the Olympic Conference in Baden Baden in 1963. So, I go there and I say, 
“South Africa must be excluded” and we gave papers to the participants. 
President Brundage, the Head of the IOC, refused to see me, so early one 
morning I knocked at his door. He sees me and I say, “Here is a letter for you” 
and I delivered a letter from Dennis Brutus who was a non-racial sports leader 
in South Africa and we had smuggled out the letter.  Then we collected the 
Africans together. Algeria had just become independent. I spoke to Algeria 
and we went to the African Group and Algeria said, “If by the time we are 
ready to apply for the Olympics, South Africa is there, we won’t even apply”.  
We got the whole African Group together and decided to call for the 
suspension of South Africa.  So they were suspended from the 1964 Games 
in Tokyo and then we made sure they were expelled later. The Western 
countries tried to reverse that decision several times but they didn’t succeed.  
We did the same thing with a whole lot of other sports. 
 
SO: Speaking of other people who were particularly active, according to the 
AAM files:  I would welcome your comment on Tunku Abdul Rahman, 
the Malaysian Prime Minister.  
  
AM: Whereas Mahathir is a modern radical, Tunku was a traditionalist.  So I went 
to see him at the Dorchester I think. So Tunku says to me, “Are you a 
Muslim?”  I said, “Yes” and he tells me, “I’m also a Muslim” and he then asks: 
“Tell me, one question: if I go to South Africa, they tell me I can’t stay in any 
hotel. Is that true?” So I told him. We had a little booklet, The Laws of South 
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Africa, just a small one that gave all the facts and I gave him that. I said, “No 
you can’t.”  He said, “But this is ungodly. How can they be in the 
Commonwealth?”  Now, while we were concentrating on Nkrumah and for 
Nehru, and the big names, about the tactics to get South Africa out - this was 
the London Commonwealth meeting in 1961. Then Tunku comes out in the 
media saying, “This ungodly country cannot be in this Commonwealth” and he 
was considered to be very conservative - so when people like him turned, the 
others didn’t have to do anything further. He had done all the work. So 
momentum was created and. it was like a dam that had burst open. It just 
came, the pressure of many people because apartheid was so wrong. At that 
time we followed around the South African Prime Minister in London; we put a 
coffin on a car and wherever he went we followed him.  It was a Sharpeville 
coffin to symbolise that massacre. 
 
SO: Sir, I’d like to ask you about the Nassau conference in 1985, your view 
of the Eminent Persons Group and also the 1986 London Special 
Review Meeting at Marlborough House. I am aware that in London you 
were organising vigils and boycotts, a day of action, prayers, 
declarations that were signed and presented, all of which comprised 
highly visible activism.   
 
 Please could you add more detail on this? 
 
AM: You see, we had to focus on the Commonwealth.  We didn’t have any other 
structure where things were happening like that and it is where, with Afro-
Asian countries and one or two white countries, we had to do such things and 
demonstrate our support.  It’s not that we planned it like that but it was also - 
and it’s now turned out to be very important for the future of the country and 
the continent - to show that there were white people in the world also 
opposed to apartheid.  And all the demonstrations we had in London: this 
solidarity action made people in South Africa realise that whilst most whites 
inside the country were brutalising them there were whites abroad who were 
against apartheid and believed in a non-racial society. 
 
SO: Going back to your point about the importance of the particular 
Secretary General, Sonny Ramphal … 
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AM: He was absolutely courageous. 
 
SO: I am aware he called for sanctions against South Africa in February 
1985, saying the world must use all the sanctions at its command 
against South Africa. 
 
AM: Yes. You see, he was totally committed and provided unique leadership at 
that time, followed by others who had to work in different circumstances. 
 
SO: A different style? 
 
AM: Yes, others had different ways of working but all had to be effective and they 
consulted regularly with AAM. 
 
SO: Yes.  I also know in 1985 that the Commonwealth Secretariat was 
inviting Mike Terry to take part in media workshops that they were 
developing to counter South African propaganda. 
 
AM: Oh, that happened a great deal. We took part in many such events, and when 
the Commonwealth Committee [CCFMSA] was formed with the Canadian 
Foreign Minister as the Chair, I had to give evidence on the arms embargo. 
 
SO: Yes.  That was in 1987. 
 
AM: Because I said to them at a meeting, they were hearing testimony in Lusaka, I 
think, and I said, “If there is an effective arms embargo, the apartheid regime 
will collapse” so they looked at me surprised and the Canadian Foreign 
Minister asked, “Can you show that?”  I said, “Yes” so I gave them a 
document to show events that were occurring.  So we wanted them to act on 
the arms embargo and financial sanctions because they had a decision to 
implement.  So then the Canadian Foreign Minister says to me, “Will you 
come to Canada? I want to engage you with my team. How many can you 
bring?  I can invite about 7 and altogether there will be about 15 people”.  So I 
told “I’m alone with a secretary in Oslo”.  So he asked, “How can you produce 
all this material?” I said, “I have to with some help”.  So, I went to Canada and 
had two days of talks. I took the opportunity to show gaps in the Canadian 
laws and Canada then corrected them; but this was our normal work, 
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remember, for the UN seminars that we arranged we made a study of each 
country’s laws controlling arms trade, so that meant virtually all Western 
countries.  So we had to say, “Belgium’s law says this, Italy’s says this.” It 
was a lot of work and if we were wrong, we would have been discredited; but 
all these years they didn’t find a single thing wrong with our information not 
one.  We made no mistake. 
 
SO: So, you were providing vital information then for the Commonwealth 
sanctions committee? 
 
AM: And they interacted in the Committee on this evidence and then I told them in 
Canada, “The apartheid system is based on force and control, and the military 
and the police are integral to that structure.  They do not have a lot of money 
to spend on defence.  If you apply financial sanctions, it reduces even further 
their capacity. There is a big problem of morale among the whites; many are 
running away from the military, the white males, as conscripts.  They were 
trying to enlist women but it failed.  They are not Israel.  Israel can enlist 
women to fight.  South African white women can’t go and fight.”  So, we put 
that to them - if you are effective in stopping the actual weapons reaching 
them, they will have no instruments to fight with; and although it’s an 
industrialised society, they cannot make the weapons that they need and the 
planes are 30 years old.  I said, “You won’t drive a motor car 30 years old with 
confidence so how are you going to fly a plane that old?”  Then the Israelis 
came in and helped South Africa to update those planes and to modernise 
them.  They were built on the same French Mirage design but later called a 
Cheetah as if it was a new plane.  
 
 We had to cover all corners so I wrote to all of the major arms manufacturers 
 to say, “You are not to sell to South Africa”.  So I would get a lot of letters 
 back saying, “We have no intention to do so”.  I had to keep them.  If I then 
 found that one of them did, I would go to the UN and say, “This one did not 
 comply. But I had to buy all the Jane’s weapon system books and magazines 
 and read them every week to monitor links with South Africa.  I also read the 
 South African propaganda magazine which I got under a false name every 
 week. 
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 But I don’t think if they know even now that I’m the same person! I don’t think 
 they do!  But I’m just saying is that we would go through it and read this every 
 week. In it they would talk about new weapon systems and how they work; 
 then I would follow that. Is South Africa going to need this? Is this naval 
 communication system going to be useful for them?  Is that essential? Then 
 we would also write to the companies. 
 
SO: So were you tracking by 1988-89 the collaboration between Israel, 
Taiwan and Chile? 
 
AM:  Yes, we published several reports about military collaboration with Israel and 
Taiwan. And regarding Chile: we caught them very nicely in 1990 when I was 
at the Namibian independence celebrations in Windhoek. The South African 
Minister of Defence went to Chile. He said he went there to talk about 
underground mines.  Then I got a journalist to follow him in Chile and he sent 
me some information.  Now, remember I’m in Namibia where South Africa is 
in occupation, so South African agents are watching me too in the hotel, so 
I’m a bit insecure.  Then I go - and in those days we were using telexes - and 
send a telex to the UN. So this Defence Minister has gone there, he is going 
to show off this weapon system on wheels and it is being launched there as if 
it’s a Chilean product.  They had an arms exhibition in Chile at the time as 
well. 
 
SO: This is the G5 you’re talking about? 
 
AM: Yes.  So then I managed to get further information from these journalists, I 
said, “Please go and get me a picture of the tyre. Just take a big picture of the 
tyre and send that.  So he managed. He got a picture and I said, “Describe it” 
over the telephone.  But, you know, another difficulty is we didn’t have much 
money, we couldn’t make many international telephone calls now but anyway 
we found the information.  Then they claimed in a statement, “This is a 
Chilean product”.  So I had to write to the UN and say, “It’s a very strange 
Chilean product that has the tyre pressure in Afrikaans. Or is it made in 
Belgium by Flemish manufacturers?” Then I would write a whole piece about 
their collaboration. 
 
SO: And then you pointed that there was a link to Iraq too. 
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AM: Iraq more seriously even threatened me.  When I went to the UN with 
information about Iraq the US was defending Iraq. When I said, “The Iraqis 
are buying a variety of items from South Africa the Security Council 
Committee didn’t seem to want to know. The Iraqi delegation wanted to see 
me. Of course the Security Council Committee meetings are confidential. The 
Iraqi representative tells me, “These things you are saying are untrue.  You 
are also writing to my President.”  I had sent telexes to the President of Iraq.” 
So I said, “You shouldn’t be doing this – trading in arms with South Africa”.  
He said, “No, we’re not doing it.  It’s all Israeli propaganda you are 
promoting”.  So I said, “No-one’s going to believe you in the Security Council 
because I have raised the question of Israel too. So you can tell everybody 
that I am promoting Israeli propaganda. You will not get very far, so don’t try 
that one”.  Then he says, “Untrue”.  I said, “Yeah okay, what about this 
particular factory where you are making the cluster bombs and the fuses from 
South Africa? The things are there”.  So he sits up straight and says: “You 
seem to know a lot about our security”, waving his finger at me.  I said, “Yes, 
it’s my job to find out about South African involvement and you shouldn’t be 
dealing in arms with them”.  So he says, “You’d better be careful because we 
know what to do with people like you” and then they walked out. 
 
SO: Whoa! 
 
AM: But those things happened and they tried to intimidate us and they sent their 
diplomat to my office in Norway because I had written to their President.   
They said they wanted to meet me. I was at an international conference in 
Sweden out in the countryside and the Iraqi Ambassador in Sweden came to 
the conference venue.   I thought he had some message for me.  He says, 
“You are writing to my President.” So I said, “Yes. Are you giving me an 
answer?”  He says, “No, I don’t know what you wrote to him about. I just had 
to come and meet you”.  So, I think these were intimidation efforts. They 
never gave me any substantial response. Then the South African regime 
gave credit guarantees for their arms trade with Iraq and I don’t know that this 
was ever recovered. 
 
SO: I know. 
 
27 
 
AM: South Africa was also asked to make a deal with Iran in the nuclear field with 
the Shah. There were many deals like that.  From Norway via the World 
Campaign we also exposed all the Danish vessels that were taking arms to 
South Africa.  The ships would go to the Canary Islands, then they would 
change the signals, and the ship would disappear and next they would arrive 
in South Africa.  The South Africans took caravans, and special trailers to the 
ship which was put in a special harbour area; they also took prostitutes there, 
and lots of money. They escorted all the sailors who wouldn’t be allowed 
anywhere else; they were given extra money and restricted since they were 
trafficking in arms.  Italy was also a source for a lot of those arms. 
 
SO: Sir, please if I move away from discussing your monitoring of breaches 
of international arms sanctions against South Africa … 
 
AM: Sorry, we’ve gone far from the Commonwealth! 
 
[Laughter] 
 
SO: You’ve helped to put the Commonwealth in context, namely it was key 
individuals in the Commonwealth who were significant supporters of 
the anti-apartheid struggle; but the Commonwealth itself … 
 
AM: No, the Commonwealth Secretariat on South Africa, for example, later, on 
sport: they played a very advanced role on information, because there were 
policies on it, you see. So I think we looked upon the Secretariat as an ally. 
That didn’t mean that they could just adopt any anti-apartheid policies. So 
they were an ally.  As I say, it was part of our normal work to see them in 
London. 
 
SO: How did others within the ANC, who were obviously outside South 
Africa, view the value of the Commonwealth? 
 
AM: They knew of our efforts and that I covered the Commonwealth Summits so it 
was okay. 
 
SO: Oh I see. So this was your designated responsibility.  
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AM: Not only in relation to the ANC, but SWAPO too. SWAPO’s representative, 
Peter Katjavivi, came to the Australian CHOGM (in Melbourne) and Thabo 
Mbeki came to the CHOGM in Kuala Lumpur. So often we encouraged them 
to attend but at least I was able to attend all the Summits. I would of course 
always inform them about all the issues, and we never had any differences. 
 
SO: I picked up a rumble in the AAM archives after the Vancouver meeting in 
1987 - there was a long minute in November 1987, and I wondered 
whether this was representative of other points of concern among other 
members of the ANC who were not happy about the Commonwealth’s 
media activities.  Donald Woods had been appointed as a consultant to 
the Secretariat on anti-apartheid media, and there was a note saying 
that the ANC were concerned about this; also that the ANC wanted 
direct liaison with the Commonwealth Secretariat over the 
implementation of Vancouver. I quote:  “They had to act fast so that the 
Commonwealth Secretariat didn’t “fix things”. I’m not saying that there 
was direct criticism of what you were doing, but I’m asking whether 
there were ANC points of concern about the Commonwealth Secretariat 
that needed to be addressed. 
 
AM: Not from me. If they had concerns of the Commonwealth - I’m not aware of 
any concerns. Well, not from the leadership.  I don’t know: maybe some 
others, because we used to share with all the liberation movements what we 
were doing.  Also, remember in London we used to have anti-apartheid 
meetings: we had annual meetings, we had reports back from the 
Commonwealth, etc. When I came back from CHOGMs, sometimes we would 
have a semi-public meeting, everybody would come and we would be quite 
transparent.  We informed all: “We did this, we did that. This we didn’t 
achieve.” People would tell us their views, because if we didn’t have that kind 
of structure we would really not have succeed.  The public could not have 
confidence in us if they didn’t know what they were associated with what we 
were doing in their name.  And then we always had a report in Anti-Apartheid 
News after the Commonwealth head’s meeting. I would also be interviewed 
on the radio at times, so people had an idea of what we were doing. 
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SO: Did you also provide briefing notes or points of contact for the Eminent 
Persons Group which went down to South Africa in between February 
and May 1986? 
 
AM: Yes, we did in advance and we would give it to the Commonwealth.  A lot of it 
was also done quietly because we did not want them to be prejudiced. 
 
SO: When the ANC had private contacts with members of the South African 
NIA and then the later meetings at Mells Park: were you also involved in 
any way with these discussions? 
 
AM: No. We kept very much to the public things, to the policy issues, not with 
deeper negotiations between them because we said, “We are not 
intermediaries”. We were very careful about that. 
 
SO: Thank you: because that would be a question from a historian, whether 
you were in fact a facilitator in any way? 
 
AM: No, we were very – well, a facilitator maybe we could say this one. But we 
were very clear. “We are not the mediators, and they mustn’t talk to us 
instead of to the Liberation Movements.” 
 
SO: So you were not a substitute nor an official spokesperson. 
 
AM: Yeah, it was solidarity.  You see, our policies were that the liberation 
movements represent the people of the country.  We are a support movement 
for them. So, we would ask everyone who wants to support us to also talk to 
their representatives. That would not only be the movements: it would also be 
if you wish generally as people now call ‘civil society’ or public opinion.  So 
they must talk with Allan Boesak and the UDF; and the Commonwealth even 
flew Allan Boesak in and out of meetings related to apartheid. 
 
SO: Yes, I had a note that he was at a number of AAM meetings. 
 
AM: I was with him at some of the meetings as well. 
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SO: Yes.  Sir, did you have any discreet meetings with any members of the 
lower ranks of the British government? 
 
AM: Yeah, we did.  First of all, before a Commonwealth meeting we’d go and see 
the Foreign Secretary.  The Foreign Secretary may say, “See a Minister of 
State”. We would go as a delegation.  Some of them would be interested in 
detail in terms of what we had to say; they may not agree with us, but overall 
for all of them, in different amounts, we added value to the information they 
had.  If you stretch right from African countries, Asian countries, Caribbean 
countries, that’s what we did.  So we also added value.  Britain had a certain 
view; and we’d say, “No, but this is happening”.  They don’t have to 
acknowledge it, but they recognised that there was another dimension.  But 
Mrs Thatcher refused to meet us. Other Prime Ministers met us and Foreign 
Secretaries.  But she was forced to meet us when she invited PW Botha to 
London; then she couldn’t resist, and had to meet us.  There was no way the 
public demonstrations could be stopped in London. 
 
 The unions also gave us a pledge: they wouldn’t allow PW Botha to sleep 
anywhere in Britain. He wouldn’t travel on any train, he would just be frozen in 
the country.  So when he was brought to Switzerland and taken by plane to 
Heathrow and then by helicopter to Chequers Mrs Thatcher arranged the 
furniture so she wouldn’t have to shake hands with him because the British 
were furious. The Germans carried out the same arrangement when he went 
to Germany, but he could sleep in Germany, but he couldn’t sleep in Britain.   
 
SO: Did you know that the Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe, who was at 
Chequers at that meeting (with Malcolm Rifkind), knew that his son was 
part of the demonstration in Trafalgar Square? 
 
AM: Yes!  Yes! Geoffrey Howe is a unique person, very, very unique. Yes, I have 
a lot of respect for him. RAB Butler, also, you see. He was Home Secretary in 
those early years and also had integrity.  We had lots of refugees coming to 
London.  I had to call them and the Home Office – I had a 24 hour emergency 
number. I had to call them; I often didn’t get much sleep at that time because 
people were coming.  Well, you see, we were following developments also in 
the 1980s, when many children were being killed in South Africa.   
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SO: Yes. 
 
AM: We had 24,000 children in prison and we held a conference in Harare with 
Trevor Huddleston. At that moment people would call and say, “The following 
ten people are charged”, and I would have to wake up at times and write the 
names very fast, to get hold of Canon Collins as well as the secret lawyers in 
South Africa, give them the names, make sure they appear in court when the 
trials took place because if they didn’t, you could have people dying and 
many were being killed and tortured. So that period was really a very, very 
intense period and you had to be alert every minute when you’d get a call.  
And if someone at Heathrow risked being sent back on the plane we would 
have to make this one call and speak to the Chief Immigration Officer and 
said, “Please hold it.  I’m getting hold of the Home Secretary’s office”.  They 
would hold it until I got hold of the office and by that time the Home 
Secretary’s office knew they had to deal with it because British politicians 
would be supporting us.  People such as Jeremy Thorpe when he was Liberal 
leader helped us a great deal as did  Humphrey Berkeley, a Conservative MP 
and a couple of others.  We also had to fund the work on political prisoners 
and were calling for the release of South African political prisoners in 1963 
because of the Rivonia Trial.  You see, we set up special committees for such 
campaigns so that we didn’t lose people who didn’t agree with sanctions. So, 
they supported the campaign to release these people.  So, we were, I think, - 
and now it’s hindsight - we were very clever in setting up ad hoc structures, 
so those who didn’t agree with us on one issue could still support other 
campaigns. And that is how we had to make each issue a campaign of its 
own, so for the Cultural Boycott we had Artists against Apartheid, then Local 
Government against Apartheid, Engineers against Apartheid, Architects 
against Apartheid, and so on - 
 
SO: [Laughs] 
 
AM: - but we had every category covered. So we set up all these structures and 
that meant that people who wanted to contribute in one area had work to do.  
So it mobilised a whole lot of the elite and others right across the board. This 
was unprecedented.  CND even at its height didn’t reach this level, so I think 
this was the last mass protest movement of its kind in Britain. And the other 
thing we proved wrong: many said that domestic opinion could never 
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influence foreign policy.  Everybody says this in all the academic literature.  
But we did. 
 
SO: I don’t agree. I think domestic politics does influence foreign policy. 
 
AM: Well, politics does, but domestic movements like these? They cannot 
because foreign policy is considered too important; it’s also dealing with 
powers, alliances, NATO. That’s how this idea goes but I mean we did, we 
broke that concept. 
 
SO: You’re talking about civil society movements/grassroots activism? 
 
AM: Yes.  Not that domestic policy doesn’t. No, the domestic environment does; 
but this is now NGO activism, being able to change policy, not just influence it 
but to change policy?  I think we did change policy.  When Harold Wilson got 
elected I went to see him with Barbara [Castle] and within a week he agreed 
to come and address our rally in Trafalgar Square in 1963. It is 50 years ago, 
and it’s vivid in my mind because we had to draft part of his text. He said he 
‘commits the Labour Party to an arms embargo against South Africa’. It was 
the first time so everybody was over the moon.  When he got into power he 
didn’t carry that out fully because they provided weapons for so-called 
external defence. 
 
SO: The shipment of Buccaneers in late 1964, yes. 
 
AM: Yes. So we went on with those campaigns.  Then when Callaghan was 
Foreign Secretary, I saw him once and I said, “Look, your Buccaneers have 
crashed in South Africa. It is not so clever, and what is it you are defending?”  
Within two weeks Simonstown was over because what Callaghan was now 
saying ‘it’s not in Britain’s Interest’, so he reversed actually all the wisdom of 
the government bureaucracy. 
 
SO: Sir, I’m very conscious that I’ve taken up a lot of your time. I do have 
some brief questions about your particular view of whether the 
Commonwealth, the Commonwealth Secretariat or indeed the British 
government, was in any way useful as facilitators during the time of 
transition from 1990 to 1994? 
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AM: Well, they all played their respective roles, but it would be in terms of their 
own policies and positions, but I think we as South Africans were strong 
enough to maintain our integrity. The argument that South Africa was going to 
have a race war: that was found to be wrong later. When I came back from 
Namibian Independence, in London, we had a big rally in Trafalgar Square. I 
didn’t speak often at the rallies but then I spoke because I had just come from 
Windhoek; so I said, “Now South Africa cannot survive”.  A very good friend 
called me and she said:  “You’re wrong.  It can’t be.  This cannot collapse”.  I 
said, “No, they have nowhere to go.  They cannot sustain that power structure 
anymore.  It’s not possible”.  And I always had an approach of this military 
dimension that the apartheid regime rests on if we knock that from under their 
legs, they will collapse - not an overnight collapse or anything but that was the 
analysis I had set out in some of the booklets as well and actually that’s what 
happened.  People were surprised at the remarkable speed with which they 
transitioned, so I think the Western countries saw the light and told the South 
Africans, “You cannot afford a revolution, because other people have had a 
revolution” and that would have resulted in destruction of the country. So I 
think that intervention by them was to avoid a hot revolution. Then I think our 
Harare Declaration (1989) gave us the principles for the transition and the 
Commonwealth helped with that Harare Declaration.  Anyway, it started as an 
African position so it was first an OAU position. You see, one can’t 
underestimate the OAU because that’s where we united a whole continent 
and when they did that; that influenced the Commonwealth and the UN.  So 
Oliver Tambo had to get on many flights with this Harare Declaration and 
travelled the world to get support and later he got his stroke and he later then 
passed away; but that was one of the great sacrifices at that time. 
 
SO: Did you contribute to the drafting of the 1989 Harare Declaration? 
 
AM: Not directly, we had to follow the OAU and the UN. It was an OAU initiative 
also to prevent any specific white minority provision and for one person one 
vote.  
 
SO: Sir, in your view then, how much did the Commonwealth help to 
contribute to the final ending of apartheid rule? 
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AM: I think the Commonwealth’s role has often been underestimated by many, but 
the Commonwealth didn’t work in isolation.  So, the Commonwealth’s value 
was that it covered several continents, it covered different cultures and all that 
and above all it included countries of the West and Australia and Canada, at 
different times took good positions.  And Canada was probably the most 
progressive, if you wish, on the African side, to be joined later by Australia. 
 
SO: Under Malcolm Fraser. 
 
AM: Yeah, and he played a big part in the Zimbabwe settlement when Nyerere 
met Thatcher in Lusaka Mrs Thatcher was so nervous and she came late in 
the night.  So, at the Summit she then met Nyerere and eventually there was 
a deal between them because the way it emerged was, “Thatcher, can you 
deliver Ian Smith?  You can’t”.  “Of course I can”.  “No, you can’t”.  “Yes, of 
course I can.  Can you deliver Mugabe?”  “Yes, I think I can”.  So, that’s how 
many say the Zimbabwe issue was resolved.  So, later journalists asked 
Nyerere what happened and he was laughing and reportedly said, “No, she 
discovered that I didn’t have horns and a tail!” 
 
[Laughter] 
 
SO: It’s interesting sir, you’re emphasising very much Nyerere and not 
Kaunda. 
 
AM: No, Kaunda was an astounding person but Nigeria was also very important, 
but you see Nyerere was the fox who at the end of each CHOGM would 
prepare for what the next conference should do. And remember he was the 
Chairman of the Front Line States. Oh, he was a real fox.  Before the 
meeting, he would say, “No, next we’re going to do this. We must work out a 
reasonable way of helping them not to close the issue”.  The depth of the man 
was just enormous.  The most underestimated African leader, enormously, 
Nyerere.  You have to remember that when they became independent they 
had no defence force; they only had police units.  They decided to support the 
liberation struggle; and they were bombed and attacked, they had to develop 
a military.  They developed it and when they acted against Idi Amin, several 
western countries even condemned him. And though they said “Africans don’t 
fight African dictators”, he did.  Some donors even said, “If you use a tin of 
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sardines from what we provide you, we will stop all aid.” That upset many 
intensely. 
 
SO: Yes, in ’79. 
 
AM: So, history has a strange way of thanking people and appreciating what they 
did with their own resources. You see, in that region it’s experience is 
unparalleled in the world, where that a liberation struggle in another country is 
supported by neighbours at great cost when a new country like Mozambique 
becomes independent it immediately supports the liberation struggle, it stops 
oil to Zimbabwe, it gets attacked. It doesn’t stop, it continues to support the 
liberation struggle.  So, where have you seen in the world that small countries 
that come out of independence act in solidarity when that threatens their very 
national survival? It doesn’t happen anywhere else. There’s no other region 
where it’s happened.  So as much as they knock Africa - it’s an unparalleled 
history and there’s no other region with that kind of solidarity. 
 
SO: And Cuba’s internationalist contribution too. 
   
AM: Cuba’s is a blood contribution. 
 
SO: Yes it was, blood and treasure. 
 
AM: I keep saying it.  Even here in the UN people forget that Cuba’s help was 
extraordinary. And of course the Nigerian President who recognised Angola 
and then he was assassinated: so there are all kinds of factors in our history  
and as the Cold War tried to engulf us then Nigeria always stood out for 
African freedom..  The West didn’t want to confront Nigeria.  Nigeria was a 
country that also paid attention to these issues, not just Tanzania.  So, 
Nigeria worked with us very closely as well. 
 
SO: What of General Obasanjo? 
 
AM: I was fortunate to have been on his steering committee for the UN/OAU 
conferences in Nigeria in 1977. It was a very important conference and I 
worked with him mainly through his Foreign Minister.  So, we worked with 
Nigeria from Day one.  Nigeria couldn’t at times understand how British 
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people were supporting Africa.  Remember in their society, they did not have 
many white people or people of other races participating in African solidarity. 
They supported me a great deal.  When I was running the office in Norway, at 
one time the new Conservative Norwegian government cut my funding.  
Nyerere told me, “Don’t ask them for a penny again.  I will give you money”.  
But I could not take money from Tanzania.  It’s a very poor country.  So, I 
fired my secretary and I bought myself a first computer [laughs]. A big - 
 
SO: It would have been the size of an armchair! 
 
AM: It was like a train engine, a very noisy thing! 
 
SO: [Laughs] 
 
AM: Ten megabytes I think and I put much of the information in there and worked 
with what I now had, so I used to work all hours. New York would finish work 
at midnight our time, and then they’d say, “Tomorrow we want a resolution on 
this”, or some other issue so I would draft it, and send it to New York.  The 
next morning they would have it because of the time difference, so General 
Garba of Nigeria had always believed that I could process information rapidly 
because of the computer without understanding that it had to have all the 
information loaded onto it. 
[Laughter] 
 So, but Tanzania continued with its support, and Nigeria later came to Oslo 
and gave us some money, “Continue your work”. Of course, Olof Palme and 
Sweden continued with their support. 
 
SO: Sir, you began that by saying that you feel that the Commonwealth’s 
contribution to transition is - 
 
AM: Is underestimated. 
 
SO: - underestimated, but it still shouldn’t be overestimated.   
 
AM: Well, it depends what you expect its role to be. But CHOGM was a fantastic 
venue for exchanges between Heads and the other great thing about the 
Commonwealth is that the leaders seemed to love going to the retreat where 
37 
 
they take no officials; they talk to each other. I’ve been with President 
Mandela on such a retreat so I later knew that’s where they talk one on one 
and collectively. They don’t have any officials. 
 
SO: So you went to Auckland? 
 
AM: Yes.  That was our first CHOGM. But for the others, we would be outside: 
President Nyerere would be inside. We’d send him a piece of paper with 
messages from time to time, he would come running out, we’d give him an 
update, he’d go in again and that is how our briefings with leaders carried on. 
Then sometimes they would come and say, “But where are you going?  This 
thing is being discussed now, you know. It is important, Prime Minister X is 
going to raise this and so on”.  And the African Head would say, “No, we have 
to go and see the Queen”, and we would think, “Good God, to see the Queen 
when this discussion is on?” so they would leave the Meeting because of their 
audiences with the Queen. 
 
SO: Sir, how much do you think the Queen has provided part of the invisible 
glue? 
 
AM: Yes, she has been very, very good on racism. She was very good on race 
relations issues but I think she’s also grateful that Nehru and other leaders 
said she’s Head of Commonwealth [NB: a reference to the 1949 London 
Declaration, confirmed in 1952]. So in addition to Head of Britain she’s played 
that wider role impeccably, quietly.  She’s reportedly had disagreements with 
Mrs Thatcher on South Africa, didn’t want race to become a factor on South 
Africa.  I believe also for President Mandela and South Africa she has had a 
high regard.  
 
SO: Was there ever any doubt within the ANC about the desirability of re-
joining the Commonwealth when President Mandela came to office in 
’94? 
 
AM: Never, no, and I was at the ceremony in London when we re-joined the 
Commonwealth. In ’94 we had a thanksgiving service in the Abbey and then 
had a reception at the Commonwealth’s Marlborough House with the Queen.  
I was there with the Deputy President Thabo Mbeki at that time.  And then we 
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played our first proper cricket match with the British so Thabo insisted on 
taking me to Lords because we had run many of the sports campaigns 
against apartheid..  So, the people from the South African cricketing world: 
well, they were still the old racists, and they tried to get me thrown out of that 
even though the Deputy President - 
 
SO: Excuse me? 
 
AM: No, no, you see but they still hated me because of what I did before when I 
also debated with them in England. We stopped them [playing international 
cricket] so they were very nasty. At one point when we went from the Long 
Room and were going onto the field to shake hands with all the players they 
even tried to stop me. There was actually a real hatred because they 
demonised us since we were active in the Anti-Apartheid movement - we 
were portrayed as not working for the interests of the country.  
 
SO: Working in the interests of South Africa. 
 
AM: They had a vision, this is the cost of you imprisoning yourselves into things, 
so we had to see if we could - 
 
SO: Break out of that? 
 
AM: - get them out, yeah. 
 
SO: If I could just ask you finally about Auckland? That was where President 
Mandela made a phenomenally moral impact in saying that Nigeria 
should be suspended from the Commonwealth because Ken Saro-Wiwa 
and other eight Nigerians who were executed on the eve of the summit.  
 
AM: No, he said it; but he anticipated that people who talked about democracy and 
so on would support it, but they were not really ready for such a thing. 
 
SO: Were they not? 
 
AM: No.  The British didn’t want to confront Nigeria. 
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SO: Oh? So if it hadn’t been for President Mandela’s - 
 
AM: They didn’t want to confront Nigeria. In fact later we got Mozambique 
accepted as a member (of the Commonwealth); but it was done very cleverly. 
 
SO: In what way? 
 
AM: Well, English is not their main language. 
 
SO: No, that I know. 
 
AM: That was quite important in the Commonwealth [laughs]. No, that was it and 
then there was a huge rally for Mandela, the country was taken over and 
many of the things he said nobody could stand against him. It was just 
impossible, this personality.  Yeah, no, no we had no hesitation to re-join the 
Commonwealth.  
 
SO: Sir, thank you very, very much indeed for your frank reminiscences. 
 
 
 
[END OF RECORDING] 
 
